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Abstract: This article evaluates the effectiveness of ex-post targeting of the direct payment 
program for mountain agriculture in Japan. A regression analysis explaining the entry into 
the  program  shows  that  the  farm  profitability  and  the  production  cost  were  significant 
positive and negative factor, respectively, in determining the uptake, while the efforts by local 
governments  were  a  robust  factor  in  facilitating  the  enrollment.  These  findings  imply 
ineffective  ex-post  targeting  and  call  for  the  differentiation  of  the  premium,  alternative 
incentives to promote forestation for the un-enrolled fields and additional funds targeted to 
those prefectures with the low uptake ratio. Lessons drawn from the Japanese experience for 
effective incentive measures in developing countries include the use of composite indicators in 
designating eligible areas to avoid the risk of insufficient targeting and the engagement of 
local governments to facilitate the entry through the reduction of transaction costs among 
participants. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The direct payment program for farmers in hilly and mountainous areas was introduced in 
Japan in 2000 with the aim of preserving environmental services from agriculture through the 
prevention of further abandonment of farmland (Yamashita, 2001). This scheme is the first 
full-fledged incentive payment in Japan specifically designed to maintain and enhance non-
economic functions exhibited by agriculture, in light of the enactment of the New Agricultural 
Basic Law in 1999 (MAFF 1999). The program was inaugurated with the initial duration of 5 
years until 2004. Despite some resistance from the budgetary authority (Ministry of Finance, 
2004),  it has  extended further 5  years  until  2009 with minor  amendments  to the  scheme 
(MAFF, 2005). It is now appropriate to take stock of the first phase of the program, given that 
a sufficient amount of data on implementation results is now available. The evaluation is 
expected not only to provide useful insights to improve the effectiveness of the scheme, but 
also  to  draw  informative  lessons  for  the  rapidly  expanding  ‘payments  for  environmental 
services’ (PES) in developing countries
1. 
 
The  concept  of  policy  evaluation  needs  to  be  understood  unambiguously,  given  than 
‘evaluation’ can be interpreted as several different meanings. Policy evaluation in programme 
level (programme evaluation) is defined as ‘a systematic and analytical assessment addressing 
important  aspects  of  a  programme  and  its  value,  and  seeking  reliability  and  usability  of 
findings’, and ‘the main objectives of evaluation are to improve decision-making, resource 
allocation  and  accountability’  (OECD,  1999).  Evaluation  can  occur  at  any  time  in  a 
programme’s life-cycle and, in this respect, a distinction should be made between ex-ante and 
ex-post evaluation. The former type of perspective analysis is often called ‘policy analysis’ or 
‘appraisal’.  While  policy  analysis  explores  policy  options  and  likely  effects,  ex-post 
evaluation examines actual effects and judges the value of policies (Jones, 2004). It is obvious 
from the aforementioned distinction that the focus of this paper is the latter type of ex-post 
evaluation. 
 
                                                 
1 The overview of payments for forest environmental services in developing countries is provided by Landell-






A programme should be evaluated against its objectives, and one of the most frequently used 
criteria for representing its performance is termed ‘effectiveness’
2. Notwithstanding a large 
volume of literature, the assessment on the effectiveness of the Japanese program is highly 
divided.  One  group  of  literature  (e.g.  MAFF,  2004a,  Odagiri,  2002a)  highly  values  its 
outcome. The main rationale is the fact that the average uptake ratio to the program was fairly 
high (85 percent in 2004 on an area basis) and that no farmland abandonment occurred in any 
plots enrolled in the program in the fast five years (665 thousands ha in 2004). Other studies 
reject such a positive assessment (e.g. Suda, 2002). They attach high importance on the failure 
of targeting exemplified by the fact the uptake ratio was high in favourable areas with high 
farm income whereas it was low in unfavourable regions with aging and steep topography. 
The former implies over-compensation while the latter suggests the under-compensation that 
would lead to farmland abandonment. This confusion suggests the need of establishing a solid 
analytical framework that includes a precise definition of ‘effectiveness’ and a criterion for 
evaluating it. 
 
The  existing  literature  on  the  performance  of  the  Japanese  program  exhibits  additional 
weaknesses. One of them is the fact that a vast majority is descriptive nature based on the data 
from the MAFF on its implementation results, lacking unambiguous quantitative evaluation 
about  the  effectiveness  of  the  program  (e.g.  Board  of  Audit,  2002;  Kashiwagi,  2004; 
Moritomo,  2002;  and  Odagiri,  2002a).  The  other  weakness  is  the  fact  that,  even  in  the 
literature  attempting  quantitative  evaluation  of  the  program  (e.g.  Yokouchi,  Ohe  and 
Kurihara, 2003, and Yonezawa and Takeuchi, 2003), its coverage is restricted to specific 
regions within a prefecture, which makes it difficult to draw general policy conclusions. In 
fact, there is no attempt to date of quantitative evaluation of the program at national level, 
which is somewhat surprising in light of high interests attached to it in Japan and potential 
relevance to similar initiatives in other countries
3. The objective of this article is to fill the gap 
by evaluating the effectiveness of the program quantitatively based on the nation-wide data on 
a prefectural basis. 
 
                                                 
2  Another  commonly  used criterion  for  programme  evaluation  is  ‘economic  efficiency’,  which  requires  the 
marginal value of the environmental outcome being at least equals to the marginal cost of generating it. Often 
these marginal values are not available and this criterion cannot be made operational (OECD, 2001a).  
3 Ohe (2004) provides a quantitative analysis of the program, but it does not aim to assess the effectiveness vis-à-






The article is structured as follows. The basic scheme of the program is summarized and the 
implementation results of its first phase from 2000 to 2004 are reviewed in the next section. 
Then,  an  analytical  framework  that  includes  a  precise  definition  of  ‘effectiveness’  and  a 
criterion and methodology in evaluating it is presented in section 3. A conceptual model 
describing the behaviour of profit-maximizing eligible farmers for enrolling in the program is 
developed in section 4. Based on the analytical framework and the conceptual model, an 
empirical model and data to be employed by a regression analysis is presented in section 5, 
while regression results, discussion based on the results and policy recommendations from the 
analysis are given in section 6. Lessons drawn from the Japanese experiences for incentive 
payments in developing countries are examined in section 7, and the paper is closed with 
summary and conclusions. 
 
2.  Review of the program 
 
Although there is no single definition of ‘hilly and mountainous areas’ in Japan, they are 
generally understood as the areas characterized by high forest cover, steep topography and the 
remoteness from major cities. Japan’s agricultural statistics designates them based on land use 
(e.g. the share of forestry), and, base on this definition, they account for around 40 percent of 
total farmland, number of farm households and value of agricultural production, respectively 
(Yamashita, 2001, p. 11). The need of specific support measures for the faming in hilly and 
mountainous areas became evident in the late 1990s in the wake of sharp increase in the 
abandonment of farmland in those areas (Table 1). This caused public concern over the loss of 
such environmental services as flood mitigation and soil and landslide prevention that has 
been  maintained  through  proper  management  of  farmland,  especially  paddy  fields
4. 
Consequently, the introduction of direct payment program specifically targeted to the farmers 
in  hilly  and  mountainous  areas  was  determined  in  1998  with  the  aim  of  preserving 
environmental services through the prevention of further abandonment of farmland (MAFF, 
1998a and 1998b). 
                                                 
4  National  Research  Institute  of  Agricultural  Economics  (1998)  provides  the  monetary  evaluation  of 
environmental  services  exhibited  by  agriculture  in  hilly  and  mountainous  areas  by  the  Replacement  Cost 






Table 1 Share of farmland abandonment ratio 
  unit  1985  1990  1995  2000 
flat areas  1.1  1.9  2.5  3.4 
hilly and mountainous areas 
% 
2.8  4.8  5.2  7.0 
Source: Yamashita, 2001, p. 32 
Note: farmland abandonment ratio = abandoned farmland / (total farmland + abandoned farmland) 
 
The  basic  scheme  of  the  program  can  be  distilled  into  three  key  parameters;  criteria  for 
designating  eligible  areas,  the  level  and  composition  of  premium  and  compliance 
requirements for the payment. The eligible areas are designated by both harsh living and 
agricultural production conditions in order to target the payment to those fields with high risk 
of abandonment. The specific criterion for harsh living conditions is an eligible municipality 
being designated by at least one of the 8 regional development laws which aims to promote 
economic  development  in  disadvantaged  regions.  These  regions  include,  among  others, 
mountainous areas, highly depopulated areas, peninsulas and isolated islands. Eligible fields 
within  eligible  municipalities  are  then  screened  primarily  based  on  their  inclination.  The 
process of screening eligible areas is presented in the upper panel of Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Schema of screening process 
 
Source: MAFF 2005a and 2005c 
Note: Numbers in this schema are those in 2004. 
Uptake areas – 665,093ha (D) 
Designated areas – 787,119ha (C) 
Eligible areas (B) 
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Eligible areas are composed of three categories and criteria for their designation are different 
each other. The eligible fields in category I should exist within 8 regional development laws 
with high inclination. Specific criteria on inclination are more than 2.9 degrees for paddy field 
and 15 degrees for upland fields, meadow and pasture, respectively
5. The eligible plots in 
category II are those within 8 regional development laws but with modest inclination. Specific 
criteria on inclination are more than 0.6 degrees for paddy field and 8 degrees for upland 
field,  meadow  and  pasture,  respectively.  The  category  III  is  those  areas  with  a  similar 
likelihood of  farmland abandonment as the  previous two  categories, but is  designated by 
prefectural governments by their own criteria. As is presented in the lower panel of Figure1, 
three  steps  are  followed  in  determining  actual  uptake  area  to  the  program:  the  central 
government  first  establishes  the  criteria  for  eligible  areas  (area  B),  local  governments 
possessing the eligible areas then designate the areas where the payments are to be made (area 
C), and farmers within the designated areas finally decide whether they enrol in the scheme 
(area D).  
 
The level of premium was determined based on opportunity costs for farmers in eligible areas 
to  continue  farming.  Specifically,  the  premium was  set  so  as  to cover  80  percent  of the 
difference in production costs of each crop (rice, upland crops, meadow and pasture) with flat 
areas. Table 2 presents specific rates of premium by inclination and land type. The premium 
is largely divided into two based on inclination, where farmland with high inclination receives 
more payment that that with low inclination, reflecting the higher production costs in the 
former farmland. A special category of premium for meadow is established irrespective of its 
inclination. The program is co-financed by the central government and local governments. 
Although the burden of local governments (prefectures and municipalities) is limited to half 
in total in the case of category I and II, their contribution is increased to two-thirds as far as 
category III is concerned with the purpose of preventing local governments from free-riding 
to the central government’s budget by designating category III areas as much as they wish
6. 
 
                                                 
5 Category I areas include ‘special meadow areas’ that cover the meadow in which the share of meadow to total 
farmland is 70 percent or more in a municipality. 
6  Another  device  to  prevent  free-riding  was  to  establish  the  ceiling  in  terms  of  category  III  areas  that 
municipalities are entitled to designate. Category III areas are limited to the sum of 5 percent of farmland within 






Table 2 Premium level by category and land type 
land type  unit 
Category I 
(high inclination) 
Category II &III 
(low inclination) 
special meadow area 
paddy filed  21,000  8,000  - 
upland field  11,500  3,500  - 
meadow  10,500  3,000  1,500 
pasture 
yen/10a 
1,000  300  - 
Source: Yamashita, 2001, p. 193. 
 
As for compliance requirements, recipients have to formulate a collective agreement with 
community members that stipulates conservation activities to be conducted for the duration of 
no less than five years. The conservation activities include proper cultivation or management 
of  fields  and  the  maintenance  of  such  common  property  resources  as  irrigation  canals, 
common ponds and community roads. Local governments (both prefectural and municipal) 
play key roles in propagating, implementing and enforcing the program and, in particular, 
municipal  governments  are  supposed  to  conduct  a  number  of  such  critical  activities  as 
designating  eligible  areas,  approving  community  agreements,  delivering  premium  and 
monitor the adherence to the agreements. The central government provides local governments 
with additional funds, apart from but proportional to the total payments to the recipients, for 
financing these complementary activities undertaken by local governments (MAFF, 2000). 
 
Table 3 presents the overview of implementation results of the program. As of FY 2004, 93 
percent  (1,484)  of  eligible  municipalities  enrolled  in  this  program  and  85  percent  (665 
thousand ha) of total eligible farmland was covered by the agreements. The share of fields 
covered by the agreements accounted for 14 percent of total farmland. More than 33 thousand 
community agreements were established and participants to them amounted to 656 thousands. 
Total payment reached to 55 billion yen. Taking the voluntary nature of this program into 
consideration, the coverage of this scheme might be satisfactory in its entirety. However, the 
uptake ratio on an area basis varies depending on a district and land type, as is shown in Table 
4. On a district basis, the uptake ratio was extremely high in Hokkaido with 96 percent, 
whereas it was low in Kantou, Kinki and Okinawa with the order of 60 percent. On the basis 
of land type, the uptake ratio was very high for meadow and pasture, both exceeding 90 
percent, while it was low for upland fields with merely 64 percent. 






Table 3 Overview of implementation results 
  unit  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
eligible municipalities  -  2,158  2,122  2,101  2,041  1,591 
  uptake municipalities  -  1,687  1,913  1,946  1,902  1,484 
    uptake ratio  %  78  90  93  93  93 
eligible areas  1000 ha  798  782  784  783  787 
  uptake areas  1000 ha  541  632  655  662  665 
    uptake ratio  %  68  81  83  85  85 
Total farmland  1000 ha  4,830  4,794  4,762  4,736  4,714 
  share of uptake areas  %  11  13  14  14  14 
total number of community agreement  -  25,621  31,462  32,747  33,137  33,331 
total participants to community agreement  1000  489  613  647  656  660 
total amount of payment  1000 yen  41,937  51,417  53,830  54,584  54,905 
Source: MAFF, 2001a, 2002a, 2003a, 2004b, 2005a and 2005c. 
Note: The decrease in the number of municipalities is due to merger. 
 
Table 4 Uptake ratio by district and land type (2004) 
  eligible areas  uptake areas  uptake ratio 
unit  1,000 ha  1,000 ha  percent 
Hokkaido  343  328  96 
Touhoku  83  66  80 
Kontou  38  26  69 
Hokuriku  33  27  84 
Toukai  13  11  83 
Kinki  41  26  63 
Chu-Shikoku  133  95  72 
Kyushu  98  81  83 
by district 
Okinawa  6  4  62 
paddy field  344  279  81 
upland field  113  73  65 
meadow  313  297  95 
by land type 
pasture  18  16  92 
Source: MAFF, 2005a. 






3.  Analytical framework 
 
In assessing the effectiveness of the payment program, several conceptual issues need to be 
clarified at the outset. These include (i) whether the analysis should focus on either ex-ante or 
ex-post targeting strategy, (ii) which criterion should be employed to assess the effectiveness, 
and (iii) what kind of methodology should be, and can be, applied from the viewpoint of 
analytical soundness and  data availability. In addition  to these conceptual challenges, the 
implication of farm-level transaction costs on the entry into the program also need to be taken 
into consideration in modelling the impact of the payment, given the scale of such costs in 
running incentive payments, as is demonstrated by Falconer, Dupraz and Whitby (2001). The 
task of this section is to establish an analytical framework for assessing the effectiveness of 
the program, and also examine the implication of farm-level transaction costs on the entry 
into the program and the devices to reduce such transaction costs. The close scrutiny of these 
issues paves the way for a conceptual model describing the behaviour of the recipients of the 
program in the section 4 and for an empirical analysis in the section 5. 
 
Conceptual issues pertaining to ex-post evaluation 
 
The effectiveness of the program can be assessed in light of the extent to which the scheme 
has delivered the payment to the predetermined target. The predetermined target in this case 
means those fields to be abandoned if the payment is not made. The issue of targeting is 
comprised of two distinct angles: ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante targeting relates primarily to 
the ‘criteria’ for designating eligible areas and the condition can be met if its key criterion (i.e. 
inclination of fields) serves as a good proxy for identifying those fields with high risk of 
abandonment and if the local governments designate eligible fields properly based on the 
determined criteria and procedure. Ex-post targeting is, on the other hand, a matter of the 
incentive structure and such a condition can be satisfied when the level and composition of 
the premium is tailored to compensate the opportunity cost of production for those fields to be 
abandoned  without  the payment.  This  paper exclusively  focuses  on  the  ex-post  targeting, 
given  that  assessing  alternative  ex-ante  targeting  strategy  is  not  feasible  due  to  data 
limitation
7. 






In  assessing  the  success  of  ex-post  targeting  in  the  program,  an  appropriate  criterion  on 
effectiveness needs to be established, and this task can be clarified by a diagram describing 
the impact of the payment on the production of a commodity and the amount of farmland 
cultivated. In Figure 2, the upward vertical axis, downward vertical axis and horizontal axis 
denote  the  price  of  outputs  (P),  quantity  of  farmland  (L)  and  quantity  of  outputs  (Q), 
respectively. The upward sloping line in the upper panel and the downward sloping line in the 
lower panel represent aggregated marginal cost curve (i.e. supply curve) and yield curve, 
respectively. The area of cultivated land is obtained by dividing the total quantity produced 
given price level by yield. The yield line is assumed to be linier for simplicity. lm, lm – l1 and  
l3  –  l1  represent  the  endowment  of  total  farmland  (A),  total  eligible  areas  (B)  and  total 
designated  areas  (C),  respectively
8,  as  is  presented  in  the  lower  panel  of  Figure  1.  The 
introduction of the flat area payment shifts the price line (p) of recipient producers upwards 
by d. As a result, the farmland l2 – l1, corresponding to the uptake areas (D) in Figure 1, is 
now cultivated, in addition to l1 which has been cultivated under the current incentive level. 
 
This simple diagram illustrates the interpretation of two different criteria in assessing the 
effectiveness of the incentive payment: environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
(Jones, 2004). ‘Environmental effectiveness’ refers to ‘the extent to which the policy meets its 
intended environmental objective, including threshold levels, targets etc’ (ibid). In the case of 
this program, the uptake ratio in an area basis as expressed D/C can be seen as an indicator for 
environmental  effectiveness,  since  the  higher  uptake  ratio,  the  most  visible  target  in  the 
program, implies that the premium level is sufficient to compensate opportunity cost and to 
prevent  farmland  abandonment.  It  is  obvious  from  Figure  2,  however,  that  meeting  the 
criterion of environmental effectiveness does not guarantee the least cost way of attaining the 
stated policy objective. The flat area payment ignoring heterogeneous land quality generates 
over-compensation to low-cost producers, corresponding to the shaded upper triangle abc in 
Figure 2.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
7 Yang, Khanna, Farnsworth and Önal (2005) addresses the cost-effectiveness of ex-ante targeting strategy of the 
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program in Illinois by using modelling approach. 
8 In this diagram, it is assumed that the local governments exclude plots with high opportunity cost, equivalent to 
lm  –  l3,  from  designation  even  if  they  are  eligible.  This  is  consistent  with  the  actual  tendency  by  local 






Figure 2 Impact of flat area payment on land use 
 
 
How can such an over-compensation be avoided? This is a question of ‘cost-effectiveness’, 
which denotes ‘the extent to which the policy achieves its stated objectives at minimum cost, 
in terms of resource allocation, budgetary expenditure etc’ (ibid). The condition for attaining 
cost-effectiveness,  while  meeting  the  environmental  effectiveness,  is  to  pay  the  premium 
equivalent to the total opportunity costs, corresponding to the shaded lower triangle bcd in 
Figure 2. In this case, over-compensation disappears completely and the premium is perfectly 
‘additional’ in a sense that the payment actually changed the behaviour of enrolled farmers 
away from abandonment to continued cultivation (Cacho, Marshall and Milne, 2003). This 
illustration clearly shows that examining the environmental effectiveness based on the uptake 
ratio target is by no means sufficient and that close scrutiny of the degree of cost effectiveness 
is indispensable in assessing its performance
9.  
 
                                                 
9 For ordinary agri-environmental payments in other OECD countries which aim to withdraw farmland from 
production (e.g. the Conservation Reserve Program of the US), ‘slippage’ is another factor in diminishing cost-
effectiveness of incentive programs. ‘Slippage’ denotes the unintended side effect of the incentive payments that 
induce the conversion of non-cropland into crop production, offsetting their potential benefits (Wu, 2000). This 
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The next task is to determine an appropriate methodological approach in assessing the cost-
effectiveness of ex-post targeting strategy of the program. Several options are examined based 
on the existing literature and the feasible methodology will be identified. The simplest way is, 
as is shown above, to estimate and compare the total payment (rectangle abcd) with the total 
opportunity  cost  of  production  (triangle  bcd).  The  former  (abcd)  and  latter  (bcd)  can  be 
viewed, roughly speaking, as the cost and benefit, respectively
10. Thus the ratio of the latter to 
the former implies the benefit-cost ratio of the program: higher the ratio, higher the cost-
effectiveness would be. Such a straightforward approach is infeasible, however, due to the 
lack  of  date  particularly  on  the  aggregate  opportunity  costs.  As  the  opportunity  cost  of 
production in each plot is a function of various factors, it cannot be directly observable and 
incurs insurmountable transaction costs for data collection.  
 
Given  the  aforementioned  obstacle,  an  alternative  approach  is  to  identify  the  factors 
determining the entry into the program through a regression analysis and to assess its cost-
effectiveness based on the existence or non-existence of systematic biases in the enrolment. 
As for the Japan’s direct payment program for example, Yokouchi, Ohe and Kurihara (2003) 
employs a probit model to examine the factors in determining the uptake in Abou District of 
Chiba Prefecture. The key conclusion from their analysis is that the uptake ratio is higher in 
those communities with, among others, high capital endowment, secured core farmers and 
high farm income, and is negatively correlated with the degree of farmland abandonment. A 
similar study can be found in Wynn, Crabtree and Potts (2001), in which factors affecting the 
entry to the Environmentally Sensitive Area Schemes in Scotland are identified by using a 
multinomial  logit  model,  even  though  the  study  does  not  intend  to  assess  the  cost-
effectiveness of the scheme. 
 
This  article  employs  a  similar  analytical  approach  as  mentioned  above,  but  the  specific 
methodology is slightly different due to data limitations. The precondition of employing a 
qualitative dependant model is the availability of the data sets that include both entrants and 
non-entrant to the scheme. Since the information on non-entrants to the program is not readily 
available in all prefectures, the approach taken by Yokouchi, Ohe and Kurihara cannot be 
replicated when the scope of the analysis is expanded into nationwide. The methodology to be 
                                                 
10 This is based on the assumption that the entry into the program automatically leads to the exhibition of 






used is therefore to estimate a linear regression model based on the data in prefectural basis, 
with  a dependent  variable being  continuous  (i.e. uptake  ratio to the  program) rather than 
discrete  (i.e.  dichotomous  choice  of  entry).  Possible  explanatory  variables  include  farm 
revenue, level of payment, production cost and transaction costs for entry,  and estimated 
coefficients of these explanatory variables provide indications as to whether the premium is 
delivered  to  the  intended  targets.  For  example,  if  the  uptake  is  proved  to  be  positively 
correlated with farm revenue in eligible areas, as suggested by Suda (2002), this implies that 
the  payments  benefit  advantageous  regions  more  and  that  the  targeting  strategy  of  the 
program is not cost-effective. 
 
Implication of transaction costs on the entry into the program 
 
Transaction costs can be defined as ‘the costs of arranging a contract to exchange property 
rights ex ante and monitoring and enforcing the contract ex post, as opposed to production 
costs, which are the costs of executing a contract’ (Matthews, 1986). Transaction costs could 
include all costs associated with any allocative decision regardless of whether the decision is 
made in a market or by a government (i.e. policies) (Challen, 2000). Transaction costs could 
therefore be divided into two categories: (i) non policy-related transaction costs, which are 
incurred by parties to voluntary transactions (e.g. market, club and voluntary provision), and 
(ii) policy-related transaction costs, which are associated with the implementation of policies. 
The former could prevent voluntary transactions from working efficiently while the latter 
could lead to inefficient policies (OECD, 2001b). 
 
There is little doubt that this scheme is transaction cost intensive since, as presented in the 
previous  section,  recipients  are  obliged  to  form  collective  agreements  among  community 
members to receive the payment. This is a notable feature of this Japanese program, given 
that almost all incentive payments with environmental objective in the US and EU target 
individual farmers rather than collective groups. Such a transaction cost intensive scheme 
naturally should accompany a complementary measure to mitigate these transaction costs and 
facilitate the entry. In this regard, the active engagement of local governments is fundamental 
to facilitate the uptake and thus is expected to exhibit ‘positive externalities’ by reducing 
policy-related  transaction  costs  at  farm  level,  This  ‘cost  saving  effect’  can  in  turn  be 
influenced by; (i) the sense of urgency by local governments on the expansion of farmland 






related  transaction  costs  and  (iii)  the  degree  of  the  economies  of  scale  in  policy-related 
transaction costs as the scale of payment increases within local governments (Aikawa, 2003). 
 
4.  Conceptual model 
 
The aforementioned conceptual framework including the implication of transaction costs on 
the  entry  enables  to  establish  a  conceptual  model  to  describe  the  behaviour  of  profit-
maximizing farmers who are eligible for enrolling in the program. At the outset, a profit 
function of eligible farmers of the payment can be defined as: 
  p = PQ + TDP – wx – c – (TTC – TCS)            (1) 
where p is profit, P is the price of a commodity, Q is the quantity of the commodity, TDP is 
total amount of premium, w is the price of a variable input, x is the quantity of the variable 
input and c is fixed cost. In addition to these standard elements of profit function, two types of 
transaction  costs  affecting  the  micro-level  decision-making  of  recipients  are  explicitly 
included in this conceptual model: these are the total transaction costs (TTC) pertaining to 
negotiate, implement and enforce the community agreement
11 and the cost saving effects of 
these transaction costs (TCS) through promotional activities by local governments to facilitate 
the enrolment.  
 
By assuming that premium is flat area payment and transaction costs are a linear function of 
area enrolled in the agreement, TDP, TTC and TCS can be rewritten as: 
  TDP = DP ´ L = DP ´ 
Q
y                (2) 
  TTC = TC ´ L = TC ´ 
Q
y                (3) 
  TCS = CS ´ L = CS ´ 
Q
y                (4) 
where DP is premium per area, L is farmland enrolled in the contract, y is the yield of the 
commodity per area, TC is transaction costs per area and CS is saved transaction costs per 
area. By substituting equations (2), (3) and (4) for equations (1), the equation (1) can be 
rewritten as: 
  p = PQ + DP 
Q
y – wx – c – (TC 
Q
y – CS 
Q
y )            (5) 
                                                 






The condition for farmers to maintain the production considering both direct payment and 
accompanying transaction costs can be obtained by taking derivative of the equation (5) with 
respect to Q and by setting the equation equals to zero. 








¶Q   – 
¶wx










 ¶Q  = 0    (6) 
Thus, the first-order condition for profit maximization can be defined as: 
  P + 
DP
y   = 
¶wx
¶Q  + 
TC – CS
 y   = MC + 
TC – CS
 y            (7) 
As the level of premium is differentiated based on the inclination of fields, the first order 
condition can be differentiated accordingly as follows: 
  eligible areas with low inclination ￿ P + 
DPl 
y  = MC + 
TC – CS
 y        (8) 
  eligible areas with high inclination ￿ P + 
DPs
y  = MC + 
TC – CS
 y         (9) 
where  DPl  and  DPs  denote  the  level  of  premium  for  eligible  area  with  low  and  high 
inclination, respectively. 






Figure 3 Impact of two-stage payment on land use 
 
 
Following the previous diagram, the impact of the program is described in Figure 3. Owing to 
the introduction of two-stage payment rates, the price line shifts upwards by 
DPl 
y  and 
DPs
y  in 
the eligible areas with low and high inclination, respectively. The marginal cost curve shifts 
upwards initially by 
TC
y  due to the existence of transaction costs, but the spill-over effects of 
saving  these  transaction  cost  act  to  restrain  this  movement  by 
CS
y .  Therefore,  the  areas 
equivalent to l2 – l1 and l4 – l3 are now being cultivated in the wake of the payment
12. The 
aggregate uptake ratio can be new expressed as: 
  URl = 
l2 – l1
 l3 – l1
 ´ 100                  (10) 
  URs = 
l4 – l3
lm – l3
 ´ 100                  (11) 
where URl and URs denote the uptake ratio in low and high inclination fields, respectively. 
 
                                                 








































5.  Empirical model and data 
 
Building on the analytical framework and particularly on the conceptual model describing 
profit maximization behaviour of recipient farmers developed in the previous section, the 
structural model on the entry into the program (UR) can be defined as: 
  UR = f (AR, DP, C, TC, CS)                (12) 
where AR, DP, C, TC and CS are the factors of agricultural revenue, level of premium, 
production costs, transaction costs pertaining to the program and the saving of transaction 
costs  due  to  spill-over  effects  through  the  efforts  by  local  governments,  respectively. 
Following the equation (7), the expected direction of the effects of these factors on the uptake 
to the program can be expressed as:  
 
¶UR
¶AR > 0, 
¶UR
¶DP > 0, 
¶UR
¶C  < 0, 
¶UR
¶TC < 0 and 
¶UR
¶CS > 0         (13) 
 
This structural model can be transformed into the empirical model to be estimated as follows, 
in light of the practical limitations on data availability: 
  URit = b0 + b1ARit-1 + b2DPit + b3AGit + b4TCit + b5CSit + eit      (14) 
where URit is uptake ratio, ARit is net agricultural revenue per capita
13, DPit is the premium 
per capita, AGit is production costs approximated by the aging of farmers, TCit is transaction 
costs in farm level, CSit is the saving of transaction costs in farm level by local governments’ 
efforts,  b0  ~  b5  are  parameters  to  be  estimated,  and  eit  is  independently  and  identically 
distributed error terms. Subscript i and t denote prefectures (i = 1, ..., N) and year (t = 1, ..., 
T), respectively. As is evident from expected direction of effects on the uptake ratio presented 
in (13), expected sign of these parameters are: 
   b1 > 0, b2 > 0, b3 < 0, b4 < 0 and b5 > 0            (15) 
 
The  definition  and  source  of  data  and  means  and  standard  deviations  for  variables  are 
presented in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. The rational and interpretation of the data on 
explanatory variables are the following. First of all, net agricultural revenue per capita (total 
net agricultural revenue divided by the number of core farm workers) is used as a variable 
representing farm revenue 
 (AR). Secondly, as an explanatory variable for the attractiveness 






recipients) is employed. Thirdly, the degree of aging (i.e. the share of farms whose owner’s 
age is 65 years old or more to total farms) is used as a proxy for production costs (AG). The 
rationale is the fact that the aging of farmers is one of the key factors determining production 
costs through (i) the increasing opportunity cost of self-labour due to the increase in pain from 
farming as farmers are getting on in years, and (ii) the high opportunity cost of self-labour for 




Table 5 Data description 
variables  definition  unit  year  scope  data source  
dependant 
variable 
uptake  ratio 
(UR) 
ratio of uptake fields to 
total eligible farmland 




















actual premium per 











ratio of farms whose 
owners are 65 years old 
or more to total farms 






number of participants in 











cost  saving 
(CS) 
ratio of eligible 
municipalities to total 
municipalities 





                                                                                                                                                          
13 One year lag (ARit-1) is used given that a farmer’s decision on the uptake is considered to be influenced by 
farm revenue in a previous year. 
14 Another reason for using aging as a proxy for production costs is that, as opposed to revenue side, there is no 






Table 6 Mean values and standard deviations for modeling variables 
variables  unit  year  mean 
standard 
deviation 
2001  67.80  18.52 
2002  71.34  17.74 
2003  71.57  17.68 
dependant variable  uptake ratio (UR)  % 
2004  71.66  17.96 
2000  1385.83  415.95 
2001  1348.79  420.59 
2002  1403.32  460.98 
farm revenue (AR)  1000 yen 
2003  1506.04  511.23 
2001  75.08  52.42 
2002  74.10  51.64 
2003  74.13  51.30 
premium (DP)  1000 yen 
2004  73.70  51.83 
production cost (AG)  %  2000  40.05  7.69 
2001  2.25  0.89 
2002  2.28  0.88 
2003  2.28  0.89 
transaction cost (TC)  person per ha 
2004  2.29  0.88 
explanatory variables 
cost saving (CS)  %  2001  65.37  26.25 
 
Fourthly, as far as transaction costs borne by farmers participating in community agreements 
are concerned, the number of participants in total uptake fields is used as an explanatory 
variable (TC), given that transaction costs are likely to increase as the density of population 
grows. The final explanatory variable, representing the degree of transaction cost saving in 
farm level through the efforts by local governments (CS), is the ratio of the municipalities 
with eligible fields to total municipalities. The underlying rationales are that, as identified in 
section 3, those prefectures with high share of eligible municipalities (i.e. high proportion of 
disadvantaged areas) are likely to (i) have high sense of urgency to the expansion of farmland 
abandonment, (ii) receive large scale funds delivered from the central government to reduce 
policy-related transaction costs and (iii) benefit from the economies of scale in policy-related 
transaction costs as the scale of payment increases. 
 
It should be noted that, as is shown in Table 5, the scope of data is not necessarily consistent 






revenue per capita) and AG (the share of farms whose owner’s age is 65 years old or more to 
total  farms)  are  available  only  in  a  prefectural  basis,  not  in  eligible  areas  within  each 
prefecture.  The  impacts  of  such  a  geographical  discrepancy  may  be  relatively  minor, 
however, for many prefectures except for those in metropolitan districts (e.g. Tokyo, Osaka 
etc), since the coverage of designated areas is fairly high and the discrepancy is considered to 
be small. Furthermore, data on DP (actual premium par capita in uptake areas) and TC (the 
number  of  actual  participants  in  total  uptake  fields)  should  have  ideally  been  ‘potential 
premium per capita in eligible areas’ and ‘the number of eligible recipients to total eligible 
areas’  in  order  to  assess  the  attractiveness  of  the  payment  by  taking  non-entrants  into 
consideration.  In  other  words,  ex-ante,  rather  than  ex-post,  indicators  should  have  been 
employed.  These  deficiencies  need  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  interpreting  the 
estimation results. 
 
6.  Regression results, discussion and policy recommendations 
 
The results of estimating the equation (14) are reported in Table 7. The ordinary least square 
method  is  used  based  on  cross-sectional  data  with  47  observations  (i.e.  total  number  of 
prefecture in Japan). The regression analysis cannot be made for the year 2000 because the 
uptake ratio by prefectural basis is not made public (MAFF, 2001a). The sign of parameters is 
largely consistent with a priori expectations as presented in (15). Table 8 presents the relative 
magnitude  of  contribution  of  each  explanatory  variable  to  the  average  uptake  ratio  in  a 
percentage term, based on the means and estimated coefficients reported in Table 6 and Table 
7, respectively.  






Table 7 Regression results 
equation (year of dependant variable) 
explanatory variables  year 
2001  2002  2003  2004 
constant    70.33*** (3.48)  59.04*** (2.79)  54.50*** (2.72)  45.09* (1.99) 
2000  0.003 (0.43)       
2001    0.01** (2.11)     
2002      0.01* (1.97)   
farm revenue (AR) 
2003        0.01** (2.24) 
2001  0.03 (0.57)       
2002    -0.06 (-0.99)     
2003      -0.04 (-0.65)   
premium (DP) 
2004        -0.06 (-0.98) 
production cost (AG)  2000  -1.20***(-4.01)  -0.77** (-2.50)  -0.62* (-1.99)  -0.42 (-1.15) 
2001  5.02* (1.72)       
2002    -0.54(-0.19)     
2003      -0.93(-0.32)   
transaction cost (TC) 
2004        -1.85(-0.62) 
cost saving (CS)  2001  0.43*** (5.33)  0.44*** (5.41)  0.46*** (5.90)  0.46*** (5.90) 
number of observations    47  47  47  47 
F value    12.62  11.80  12.45  12.41 
adjusted R square    0.56  0.54  0.55  0.55 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-values. *, ** and *** show significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
 
Table 8 Percentage contribution of each variable to the uptake ratio 
year of dependant variable 
explanatory variables 
2001  2002  2003  2004 
constant  103.7  82.8  76.2  62.9 
farm revenue (AR)  5.6  28.2  23.9  29.8 
premium (DP)  3.5  -6.1  -3.9  -5.9 
production cost (AG)  -70.9  -43.5  -34.8  -23.2 
transaction cost (TC)  16.7  -1.7  -3.0  -5.9 
cost saving (CS)  41.4  40.4  41.6  42.4 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
The regression results can be distilled into the following four findings. First of all, it is found 






factor in raising the uptake to the program after 2002, with its contribution being between 20 
and 30 percentage points to the average uptake ratio. This implies that the ex-post targeting 
strategy  was  not  effective  enough,  attracting  more  profitable  regions  while  failing  to 
compensate the cost gap with less profitable regions. Secondly, the estimation results show 
that the level of premium (DP) and the transaction costs (as exemplified by the number of 
participants in total uptake fields, TC) had little impact on the enrolment to the program. 
These results do not necessarily mean, however, that the premium level was sufficient to 
compensate the cost gap and the transaction costs were not serious obstacle in formulating 
community agreements in light of the ex-post nature of these variables as cautioned in the 
previous section. 
 
The third notable finding from the analysis is that the production cost approximated by aged 
farmer ratio (AG) was a statistically significant negative factor in hampering the entry. This 
implies  that  the  level  of  premium  was  insufficient  to  attract  those  prefectures  with  high 
opportunity cost for continued cultivation and thus ex-post targeting was not cost-effective. It 
should be noted, however, that the negative impact of this aging factor on the enrolment had 
declined gradually from around 70 percentage points in 2001 to 30 percentage points in 2003, 
and the aging was no longer a statistically significant factor in impeding the entry as of 2004. 
This shows that those prefectures with relatively high degree of aging raised the uptake ratio 
than other prefectures and that the inverse relationship between aging and uptake ratio had 
weakened as the program penetrated into local governments and communities over time
15. 
Finally, it is found that the cost saving efforts by local governments (CS) had consistently 
been  a  robust  factor  in  facilitating  the  uptake  by  raising  the  uptake  ratio  by  about  40 
percentage points. This can be interpreted that the spill-over effects by local governments 
might have promoted the uptake presumably through reducing transaction costs at farm level.  
 
In light of the objective of this article to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of ex-post targeting 
strategy,  what  policy  recommendations  can  be  drawn  from  the  analysis  to  improve  the 
effectiveness of the program? The first recommendation relates to the structure of incentive 
premium and the scope of eligible areas. The positive correlation of farm profitability and 
                                                 
15 It is reported that some municipalities designated eligible areas only if community agreements became likely 
to  be  established,  or  excluded  some  parts  from  predetermined  eligible  areas  when  community  agreements 






negative association of aging with the entry into the program show that the ex-post targeting 
strategy  can  be  improved  by  further  differentiating  the  premium  level  so  as  to  match 
heterogeneous  land  quality.  It  is  not  feasible,  however,  to  preserve  even  extremely 
disadvantaged fields by substantially raising premium (Suda, 2002), since it was not the initial 
intent of the policy-makers, as exemplified by the simplified two-staged payment rates based 
on average production costs (Yamashita, 2001, p. 109). Given that the entry into the program 
served as a touchstone to differentiate those fields where farming can be continued from 
others where it can no longer be possible, a complementary measure should be introduced to 
provide alternative incentives to promote forestation for the fields that did not enrolled in the 
program to prevent the loss of environmental services that has been exhibited by agriculture. 
 
The second policy recommendation is concerned with the roles of local governments. The 
statistically  robust  positive  correlation  between  the  efforts  by  local  governments  and  the 
uptake ratio implies that the observed large discrepancy of the uptake ratio among prefectures 
can be resolved partly by more active engagements by those prefectures with low uptake 
ratio
16.  Although  the  central  government  has  already  delivered  funds  to  prefectural  and 
municipal  governments  to  save  policy-related  transaction costs,  there  is  a  possibility  that 
those prefectures having relatively small proportion of eligible areas failed to exploit cost 
saving originating from the economies of scale in policy-related transaction costs, because the 
funds are proportional to the scale of eligible areas within a prefecture. Thus, additional funds 
exclusively targeted to those prefectures with the low uptake ratio are expected to act as an 
effective measure to overcome high average policy-related transaction cost and to narrow the 
discrepancy of the uptake ratio. 
 
7.  Lessons for incentive payments in developing countries 
 
The  findings from the evaluation of Japan’s  direct payment program  can provide  several 
useful lessons for similar incentive payments with environmental objectives, which have been 
mushrooming both in developed and developing countries. In OECD countries, environmental 
considerations  are  increasingly  integrated  into  the  overall  agricultural  policy,  and  direct 
                                                                                                                                                          
manipulate (i.e. reduce) eligible areas with an attempt to raise uptake ratio, given that the low ratio can be 
perceived as their negligence by residents, prefectural governments and the central government. 
16 This is especially relevant for the prefectures in metropolitan regions. The uptake ratio in Tokyo, Kanagawa 






payments to farmers to improve environmental outcome, often termed ‘agri-environmental 
payments’, play a prominent role for this purpose (OECD, 2003). In developing countries, 
even if the application of incentive payments is still thin as far as in agricultural sector is 
concerned;  there  is  a  mounting  interests  in,  and  actual  initiatives  of,  ‘payments  for 
environmental  (or  ecosystem)  services’  (PES)  targeting  mainly  forestry  in  Latin  America 
(Pagiola, Arcenas and Platais, 2005). The purpose of this section is to draw lessons from the 
Japanese  experience  for  designing  and  implementing  eventual  incentive  measures  for 
environmental services from agriculture in developing countries, given the scarceness of such 
literature.  
 
Although  a  number  of  obstacles  have  been identified in  initiating  incentive  measures for 
environmental services in developing countries, one of the most serious impediments is high 
transaction  costs  reflecting  the  insufficient  institutional  development  in  these  countries 
(Sakuyama, 2005). In this regard, the following two lessons can be drawn from Japanese 
experience  to  save  transaction  costs  in  designing,  implementing  and  enforcing  effective 
incentive measures in developing countries. The first lesson relates to the transaction costs for 
incentive  design.  One  of  the  biggest  challenges  in  designing  incentive  payments  for 
environmental purposes is to determine the appropriate level and structure of premium so as 
to change the behaviour of recipients (i.e. additionality) by compensating the opportunity 
costs incurred for more environmentally benign alternative actions. It is needless to say that 
tailored payments are superior in terms of better targeting and higher cost-effectiveness of the 
program. The difficulty is that the targeting, or precision, necessitates high transaction costs 
for  collecting  information  on  the  opportunity  costs  (Vatn,  2002),  and,  in  many  cases, 
sufficient information for perfect precision can never be obtained, even whatever efforts are 
made, due to insurmountable transaction costs.  
 
A most commonly used devise to solve this trade-off between precision and transaction costs 
in designing incentive payments is to find a proxy to represent the level of opportunity costs 
for alternative action. In the case of Japan, it was primarily the inclination of fields that were 
employed as an indicator for approximating the risk of farmland abandonment and the amount 
of premium, as is shown in section 2. It is also evident from the analysis in this paper that the 
                                                                                                                                                          
respectively,  and the corresponding  share  of  eligible  municipalities  to  total  municipalities  was  8,  19  and  7 






targeting strategy mainly on steepness was not effective enough, attracting more productive 
regions while deterring those areas with high level of aging, and thus leaves room for further 
improvement.  Even  though  there  cannot  be  ‘one-size-fits-all’  indicators  in  terms  of  an 
appropriate proxy for designating eligible areas and determining the level and structure of 
premium due to the site-specific nature of every environmental services, one lesson that can 
be  learned  from  unsatisfactory  Japanese  experience  is  to  employ  composite  indicators  to 
avoid the risk of insufficient targeting by relying on a single proxy. 
 
The  second  lesson  from  the  Japanese  experience  is  about  the  transaction  costs  for  the 
implementation of incentives. One of the notable features of the Japanese program is that the 
payments are in principle made to a group of community members rather than individual 
farmers. Such type of payments seems to be quite rare in developed countries in Europe and 
North America, but is widely observed in the PES in developing countries, such as those in 
Mexico  and  Costa  Rica  (Pagiola,  Arcenas  and  Platais,  2005).  In  addition  to  these  two 
examples,  payments  to  a  group,  rather  than  individual,  are  considered  to  be  an  effective 
mechanism for  those developing countries with having dense farming  population in rural 
areas or large share of such common pool resources as community roads, ponds and irrigation 
canals, as a mean to save policy-related transaction costs that would otherwise be necessary in 
the case of individual contracts. Contrary to the previous example, therefore, the Japanese 
case can provide a positive lesson for these developing countries in this regard.  
 
Although ascertaining the amount of transaction costs saved through the exploitation of group 
contracts is not the aim of this paper, the merit of the group contracts is obvious, by merely 
reconfirming the number of participants to this scheme (660 thousands in 2004) as reported in 
Table 3. The lesson that can be drawn from the analysis is not necessarily about the amount of 
transaction cost saved through group contracts, therefore, but about the importance of the 
roles of local governments in promoting this new type of incentive payments to local farmers. 
The group contracts can be seen as a device to transfer the policy-related transaction costs 
incurred away from a provider (i.e. governments) of payments to a group of their recipients, 
and  the  key  for  its  success  depends  on  the  smooth  coordination  among  participants  in 
negotiating conditions and implementing and enforcing the contracts by saving transaction 






engagements of local governments can reduce these transaction costs among participants and 
thus support measures to them play a decisive role to facilitate the entry into the programs.  
 
8.  Summary and conclusions 
 
This  article  aims  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  ex-post  targeting  strategy  of  the  direct 
payment program for the farmers in hilly and mountainous areas in Japan, with a view to 
providing insights to improve its performance as well as to drawing lessons for the payments 
for environmental services in developing countries. An analytical framework developed in 
this article provides the rationale for the analytical approach of this paper, which focuses on 
the issue of ex-post targeting strategy rather than ex-ante, employs cost-effectiveness as a 
‘criterion’ for effectiveness, and estimates a linear regression model explaining the entry into 
the program as a feasible ‘methodology’ in evaluating its cost-effectiveness. Based on the 
analytical  framework,  a  conceptual  model  describing  the  behaviour  of  profit-maximizing 
eligible farmers for enrolling in the program is developed to identify the factors determining 
the entry into the program, and the linear regression model on the uptake to the program was 
estimated based on cross-sectional data on a prefecture basis from 2001 to 2004. 
 
It was found from the regression analysis that, although their impacts changed during the 
estimation period, the farm profitability and the production cost approximated by aging were 
significant positive and negative factor, respectively, in influencing the uptake to the program. 
It was also found that the efforts by local governments were consistently a robust factor in 
facilitating the uptake to the program by raising the uptake ratio. The former finding show 
that the ex-post targeting strategy of the program was not cost-effective, whereas the latter 
implies the spill-over effects by local governments promoted the uptake presumably through 
reducing transaction costs at farm level. Two main policy recommendations are identified to 
improve the effectiveness of the program. The first is to differentiate further the premium 
level so as to match heterogeneous land quality, while simultaneously to provide alternative 
incentives to promote forestation for the fields that did not enrolled in the program. The 
second policy recommendation is to introduce additional funds exclusively targeted to those 
prefectures with the low uptake ratio. 
 
The following two lessons can be drawn from Japanese experience to design, implement and 






given  that  one  of  the  most  serious  impediments  is  high  transaction  costs  reflecting  the 
insufficient  institutional  development  in  these  countries.  The  first  lesson  relates  to  the 
transaction  costs  for  incentive  design.  Unsatisfactory  Japanese  experience  on  ex-post 
targeting strategy demonstrates the importance to employ composite indicators in designating 
eligible areas to avoid the risk of insufficient targeting by relying on a single proxy. The 
second  lesson  from  the  Japanese  experience  is  about  the  transaction  costs  for  the 
implementation of incentives. The analysis of the Japanese case shows that local governments 
can play a decisive role to facilitate the entry through their active engagements to reduce these 
transaction costs among participants. 
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